# 2AC

## 2ac a2: framework (long) [4:00]

A. “Resolved” means to reduce by analysis

Random House, 2k11

1. to come to a definite or earnest decision about; determine (to do something): I have resolved that I shall live to the full. 2. to separate into constituent or elementary parts; break up; cause or disintegrate (usually followed by into ). 3. to reduce or convert by, or as by, breaking up or disintegration (usually followed by to or into ). 4. to convert or transform by any process (often used reflexively). 5. **to reduce by mental analysis** (often followed by into ).

B. “Should” is an expression of desirability

OED, 2k13

verb (3rd sing. should) 1**used to indicate obligation**, **duty**, **or correctness**, **typically when criticizing someone’s actions**: he should have been careful I think we should trust our people more you shouldn’t have gone **indicating a desirable or expected state**: by now pupils should be able to read with a large degree of independence used to give or ask advice or suggestions: you should go back to bed what should I wear? (I should) used to give advice: I should hold out if I were you

A. “Restriction” is a “limiting condition”

OED, 2k13

**a limiting condition or measure**, especially a legal one: planning restrictions on commercial development [mass noun] the limitation or control of someone or something, or **the state of being restricted**: the restriction of local government power

D. Their framework is a restriction on the transition to energy production from sustainable sources

Scrase, 2k10

[Scrase, J. Ivan, and David G. Ockwell. "The role of discourse and linguistic framing effects in sustaining high carbon energy policy—An accessible introduction." Energy Policy 38.5 (2010): 2225-2233]

**There is a dominant conception of policy-making as an objective**, **linear process**. In essence the process is portrayed as **proceeding in a series of steps from facts to analysis**, **and then to solutions** (for a detailed critique of this linear view see Fischer, 2003). **In reality**, **policy-making is usually messy and political**, **rife with the exercise of interests and power**. **The veneer of objective**, **rational policy-making**, **that the dominant**, **linear model of policy-making supports is therefore cause for concern**. **It effectively sustains energy policy ‘business as usual’ and excludes many relevant voices that might be effective in opening up space to reframe energy policy problems and move towards** more **sustainable solutions** (see, for example, Ockwell, 2008). **This echoes concerns with what counts as knowledge and whose voices are heard in policy debates** that have characterised strands of several literatures in recent decades, including science and technology studies, sociology of scientific knowledge, and various strands of the political science and development literatures, **particularly in the context of** knowledge, **discourse and democracy**. **An alternative to the linear model is provided by a ‘discourse’ perspective**. This draws on political scientists’ observations of ways in which **politics and policy-making proceed through the use of language**, **and the expression of values and the assumptions therein**. **Discourse can be understood as**: ‘… **a shared way of apprehending the world**. **Embedded in language it enables subscribers to interpret bits of information and put them together into coherent stories or accounts**. **Each discourse rests on assumptions**, **judgements and contentions that provide the basic terms for analysis**, **debates**, **agreements and disagreements**…’ Dryzek (1997, p.8). **A discursive approach rejects the widely held assumption that policy language is a neutral medium through which ideas and an objective world are represented and discussed** (Darcy, 1999). **Discourse analysts examine and explain language use in a way that helps to reveal the underlying interests**, **value judgements and beliefs that are often disguised by policy actors’ factual claims and the arguments that these are used to support**. For example UK energy policy review documents issued in 2006–2007 are criticised below for presenting information in ways that subtly but consistently favoured new nuclear power while purporting to be undecided on the issue. **People** (including scientific and policy experts) **base their understanding of problems and solutions on their knowledge**, **experiences**, **interpretations and value judgements**. **These are** coloured and **shaped by social interactions**, for example by what is considered an ‘appropriate’ perspective in one's work life within certain institutions. **Policy actors therefore expend considerable effort on influencing the design and evolution of institutions in order to ensure problems and solutions are framed in ways they favour**. Thus **discourse is fundamental to the way that institutions are created**, **but in the short-term institutions also have a constraining or structuring effect**. At a more fundamental level there are even more rigid constraints, which can be identified as a set of core imperatives, such as sustained economic growth and national security, which states and their governments, with very few exceptions, must fulfil in order to ensure their survival (Dryzek et al., 2003—these are explored in detail further below).

4. No objective standard for textual interpretation

Gehrke, 1998

[Gehrke, Pat J. "Critique arguments as policy analysis: policy debate beyond the rationalist perspective." Perspectives in Controversy: Selected Essays from Contemporary Argumentation and Debate (2002): 302. Published in 1998]

Similarly, we might say that **any policy debater who does not seek a critical consideration of the questions that a policy proposal tries to foreclose is only doing half the job of a policy analyst**. Additionally, Berube assumes that we have pure and direct knowledge of the meanings of a text. However, **in order to understand the meanings of a text we must interpret that text**. When advocates speak, we inevitably interpret what they say. **Meanings are found in the act of interpretation**, **and those meanings differ**, **at least slightly**, **between interpretations**. **There is virtually no text in a debate that can inspire one universally agreed upon interpretation**. **As listeners and readers**, **we can never find ourselves at a point where** the intentional, naive, and rogate **meanings of a text are objectively transparent to us**. Determining what questions a text invites requires interpreting the text, and these interpretations will vary, producing contrary readings of what questions may be asked of that text. **There is no way to reconcile interpretations objectively**. **In order to evaluate competing interpretations**, **one would have to engage in** precisely the **critical textual analysis** Berube attempts to foreclose. **Since every interaction with a text is interpretive**, Berube's **objective standard for encountering a text never can be met**.

C. Traditional debate isn’t neutral – appeals to fairness are a neoliberal myth that obscures violence

Zizek and Daly, 2k4

[Slavoj, Prof. of European Graduate School, Intl. Director of the Birkbeck Inst. for Humanities, U. of London, and Senior Researcher @ Inst. of Sociology, U. of Ljubljiana, and Glyn, Professor Intl. Studies @ Northampton U., “Risking the Impossible” <http://www.lacan.com/zizek-daly.htm>]

This is not to endorse any kind of retrograde return to economism. Zizek's point is rather that in rejecting economism we should not lose sight of the systemic power of capital in shaping the fives and destinies of humanity and our very sense of the possible. In particular we should not overlook Marx's central insight that in order to create a universal global system the forces of capitalism seek to conceal the politico-discursive violence of its construction through a kind of gentrification of that system. **What is persistently denied by neo-liberals**; such as Rorty (1989) and Fukuyama (1992) **is that the gentrification of global liberal capitalism is one whose "universalism" fundamentally reproduces and depends upon a disavowed violence that excludes vast sectors of the world's population**. In this way, **neo-liberal ideology attempts to naturalize capitalism by presenting its outcomes of winning and losing as if they were simply a matter of chance and sound judgement in a neutral marketplace**. **Capitalism does indeed create a space for a certain diversity**, **at least for the central capitalist regions**, **but it is neither neutral nor ideal and its price in terms of social exclusion is exorbitant**. **That is to say**, **the human cost in terms of inherent global poverty and degraded "life-chances" cannot be calculated within the existing economic rationale and, in consequence**, **social exclusion remains mystified and nameless** (viz. the patronizing reference to the "developing world"). And Zizek's point is that **this mystification is magnified through capitalism's profound capacity to ingest its own excesses and negativity**: **to redirect** (or misdirect) **social antagonisms and to absorb them within a culture of differential affirmation**. Instead of Bolshevism, the tendency today is towards a kind of political boutiquism that is readily sustained by postmodern forms of consumerism and lifestyle.

B. Our education is unique and necessary – it challenges our discursive commitments to existing energy systems in debate

Scrase, 2k10

[Scrase, J. Ivan, and David G. Ockwell. "The role of discourse and linguistic framing effects in sustaining high carbon energy policy—An accessible introduction." Energy Policy 38.5 (2010): 2225-2233]

It is here that the second failure of a linear, objective view of the policy process arises. **Not only do judgements have to be made in the face of scientific uncertainty**, **they are coloured by participants’ values and specialist knowledge**, **which in turn are shaped by argument and debate with colleagues and**, **more generally**, **by debates within society**. Moreover people's **values**, **or at least the positions they take in these debates**, **are conditioned by their material commitments to existing energy systems and energy-based practices**. To put it more simply, actors’ understanding of their own interests never lies far below the surface in practice. **Policy-making is therefore by no means the value neutral**, **objective activity that a linear view of the policy process would suggest**. And nor should it be. Politicians are elected on the basis of the values that they claim to stand for. People therefore reasonably assume that these values will be formative in policy makers’ decisions. **All too often**, **however**, **the subjective roles of specialist knowledge**, **ideas**, **values**, **beliefs**, **and underlying interests are ignored in policy discussions**. As Adams et al. (2003, p.1915) put it: ‘…**policy debates** are often flawed because of the assumption that the actors involved share an understanding of the problem that is being discussed. They **tend to ignore the fact that the assumptions**, **knowledge**, **and understandings that underlie the definition of [policy] problems are frequently uncertain and contested**.’ **In this way the ideas of certain actors are often dismissed as they fail to fit with dominant ways of expressing knowledge claims within institutional contexts**. **For example**, **in the aftermath of Chernobyl**, **Cumbrian sheep farmers’ knowledge about the physical properties of the soil in the Lake District was ignored by government scientists**. **This led to an ill-informed and ineffective policy response**, **while creating antagonism and fostering distrust of officials and experts** (Wynne, 1996). **Recognising the ways in which values**, **beliefs and ideas are shaped and drawn upon in the construction of policy problems and solutions makes it possible to reach a better understanding of the policy process**. **It is an arena that involves the interplay of different and often competing ‘knowledge claims’ of various actors**. **Sometimes these conflicts are between the different types of knowledge** (‘knowledges’) **of lay or local actors and those of experts**, **but they can equally constitute contests within local or specialist communities**. In 2006, for example, the UK government argued that the nation needs a new generation of nuclear electricity stations to tackle climate change and provide energy security (DTI, 2006a). This assertion reflects the knowledge claims of the nuclear industry as well as some scientists. Nuclear energy's proponents portray it as harnessing science for society's benefit, providing secure, low carbon electricity. Its opponents portray it as socially and environmentally damaging, emphasising the authoritarianism and secretiveness that have attended its use, the risks of radiation releases, sabotage and weapons proliferation, or simply argue that it is expensive and unnecessary. It is therefore difficult to see the policy decision to build new nuclear power stations in the UK as the result of a simple, rational, linear policy process. **A more accurate interpretation would be to see it as a value or interest-based decision to accept the knowledge claims of certain actors**. As demonstrated below, **a lot can be revealed by focussing on the language that actors use to promote certain discourses that fit well with the way in which energy policy issues have been framed**. **It is at the level of discourse that the dynamic conflicts and alliances between different knowledge holders are expressed in policy processes** (Ockwell and Rydin, 2006).

B. Fetishizing instrumental education kills resistance to Neoliberalism

Giroux, 2k11

[Henry, Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, *Left Behind? American Youth and the Global Fight for Democracy*, <http://www.truth-out.org/left-behind-american-youth-and-global-fight-democracy68042>]

Meanwhile, not only have academic jobs been disappearing, but given **the shift to** an **instrumentalist education** that is technicist in nature, students have been confronted for quite some time with a vanishing culture for sustained critical thinking. **As universities** and colleges **emphasize market-based skills**, students are neither learning how to think critically nor how to connect private troubles with larger public issues. The humanities continue to be downsized, eliminating one source of learning that encourages students to develop a commitment to public values, social responsibilities and the broader demands of critical citizenship. Moreover, critical thinking **has** been **devalued** as a result of the growing corporatization of **higher education**. Under the influence of corporate values, thought in its most operative sense loses its modus operandi as a critical mediation on "civilization, existence and forms of evaluation."(34) Increasingly, **it has become more difficult for students to recognize how their education** in the broadest sense **has been systematically devalued** and how this not only undercuts their ability to be engaged critics, but contributes further to making American democracy dysfunctional. How else to explain the reticence of students in protesting against tuition hikes? **The forms of instrumental training** they receive **undermine any critical capacity to connect the fees they pay to the fact that the United States puts more money into the funding of war**, **armed forces and military weaponry than the next 25 countries combined - money that could otherwise fund higher education**.(35) **The inability both to be critical of such injustices and to relate them to a broader understanding of politics**, **suggests a failure to think outside of the normative sensibilities of a neoliberal ideology that isolates knowledge and normalizes its own power relations**. In fact, one recent study found that "45 percent of students show no significant improvement in the key measures of critical thinking, complex reasoning and writing by the end of their sophomore years."(36) **The corporatization of schooling over the last few decades has done more than make universities into adjuncts of corporate power**. **It has also produced a culture of illiteracy and undermined the conditions necessary to enable students to be engaged and critical agents**. **The value of knowledge is now linked to a crude instrumentalism and the only mode of education that seems to matter is one that enthusiastically endorses learning marketable skills**, **embracing a survival-of-the-fittest ethic and defining the good life solely through accumulation and disposing of the latest consumer goods**. **Academic knowledge has been stripped of its value as a social good**; **to be relevant and therefore funded**, **knowledge has to justify itself in market terms or simply perish**.

D. Switch-side is an instrumental form of education

Hicks and Greene in 2k5

(darrin and walter, LOST CONVICTIONS Debating both sides and the ethical self-fashioning of liberal citizens, cultural studies, vol 19 no 1)

But why dredge up this event from the archive of communication education? First, **since the collapse of the** Soviet **Union there has been a vigorous trade in debate as a tool for democratic education**, often **with the hope of inculcating students with the norms necessary for deliberative democracy**. For example, since 1994, the International Debate Education Association ‘has introduced debate to secondary schools and universities throughout Central and Eastern Europe, the Former Soviet Union, Central Asia and Haiti and continues to grow throughout the world’ (idebate.org 2004). **The promotion and circulation of debate as a technique of democratic decision-making suggests a need to explore the history of its ethical problematization.** As a cultural technology, **the value of debate rests on its claim to cultivate the ethical attributes required for democratic citizenship.** Therefore, those challenges to debate’s civic function require special consideration in order to assess the role of communication in the selffashioning of liberal citizens.1 In Foucauldian fashion, **we are interested in the ethical problematization of debating both sides so that we might learn how this pedagogical technique organizes forms of democratic subjectification available in the present** (Foucault 2001). The second reason to write about the **debating both sides** controversy is because it **highlights how communication becomes an object, instrument and field of cultural governance**. **The emphasis on the linguistic dimension of communication tends to privilege a** methodological and **political commitment to read the circulation of power as an ideological phenomenon mediated by the process of generating** and controlling **the meaning of contested** values, identities, and **symbols** (Nelson & Gaonkar 1998, Rosteck 1999). As an alternative to this vision of a ‘communicational cultural studies’ (Grossberg 1997) **this paper highlights the ‘technical dimension’ of speech**, that is, **its circulation as an object and instrument for regulating the conduct of citizensubjects**. 2 Therefore, we approach the debating both sides controversy in terms of what Michel Foucault (2001) calls a ‘history of thought’ \_/ a ‘history of how people become anxious about this or that’ (p. 74). Moreover, **to write a history of debate as a cultural technology reveals how power works productively by augmenting the human capacity for speech/communication**. For us, **an under-appreciated aspect of the productive power of cultural governance resides in the generation of subjects who come to understand themselves as speaking subjects willing to regulate** and transform **their communicative behaviours for the purpose of improving their political**, economic, cultural and affective **relationships**.3 This paper argues that **the strong liberal defence of debating both sides separates speech from conviction**. **Debating both sides does so by de-coupling the sincerity principle from the arguments presented by a debater**. In place of the assumption that a debater believes in what he or she argues, **debating both sides grooms one to appreciate the process of debate as a method of democratic decision-making**. We argue the **debating both sides** controversy **articulates debate to** Cold War **liberal discourses of ‘American exceptionalism’ by folding the norm of free and full expression onto the soul of the debater**. In turn, **a debater willing to debate both sides becomes a representative of the free world**. Furthermore, we will demonstrate how debating both sides as a technique of moral development works alongside specific aesthetic modes of class subjectivity increasingly associated with the efforts of the knowledge class to legitimize the process of judgment. **Debating both sides reveals how the globalization of liberalism is less about a set of universal norms and more about the circulation and uptake of cultural technologies**.

D. Their education cedes politics to the elite

Kappeler, 95

[Susanne, Freelance author and professor, *The Will to Violence: The Politics of Personal Behavior*, pgs. 9-11, 1995]

War does not suddenly break out in a peaceful society; sexual violence is not the disturbance of otherwise equal gender relations. Racist attacks do not shoot like lightning out of a non-racist sky, and the sexual exploitation of children is no solitary problem in a world otherwise just to children. **The violence of our** most commonsense **everyday thinking**, and especially our personal will to violence, **constitute the conceptual preparation**, **the ideological armament and the intellectual mobilization which make the 'outbreak' of war**, **of sexual violence**, **of racist attacks**, **of murder and destruction possible at all**. 'We are the war', writes Slavenka Drakulic at the end of her existential analysis of the question, 'what is war?': I do not k n o w what war is, I want to tell [my friend], but I see it e v e r y w h e r e . It is in the b l o o d - s o a k e d street in Sarajevo, after 2 0 people have b e e n killed while they queued for bread. But it is also in your n o n - c o m p r e h e n s i o n , in my unconscious cruelty towards you, in the fact that y o u have a y e l l ow f o rm [for r e f u g e e s | and I d o n ' t , in the way in w h i c h it grows inside ourselves and changes our feelings, r e l a t i o n - ships, values — in short: us. W e are t h e war . . . And I am afraid that we cannot hold anyone else responsible. W e make this war possible, we permit it to happen.5 '**We are the war'** — **and we also 'are' the sexual violence**, **the racist violence**, **the exploitation and the will to violence in all its manifestations in a society in so-called 'peacetime'**, **for we make them possible and we permit them to happen**. We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society — which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as , Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of'collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equivalent of a universal acquittal.6 On the contrary, **the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations**. **Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action**. **We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective 'assumption' of responsibility**. **Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence**, **our own power and our own responsibility** — **leading to the well-known illusion of our apparent 'powerlessness' and its accompanying phenomenon**, **our so-called political disillusionment**. **Single citizens** - even more so th ose of other nations — **have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events** as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina or Somalia — **since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere**. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgement, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, **it seems to absolve us f r om having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events**, **or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions**. It not only shows that **we participate in** what Beck calls **'organized irresponsibility'**, **upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically**, **institutionally**, **nationally and also individually organized separate competences**. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major powermongers. For **we tend to think that we cannot 'do' anything**, **say**, **about a war**, **because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation**; **because we are not where the major decisions are made**. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of 'What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as 'virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN — finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like 'I want to stop this war', 'I want military intervention', 'I want to stop this backlash', or 'I want a moral revolution.'7 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our 'non-comprehension': **our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding**, **preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer**. And we 'are' the war in our 'unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the 'fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don't' - our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the 'others'. **We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us**, **that is**, **in the way we shape 'our feelings**, **our relationships**, **our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence**. So if we move beyond the usual frame of violence, towards the structures of thought employed in decisions to act, this also means making an analysis of action. This seems all the more urgent as action seems barely to be perceived any longer. **There is talk of the government doing 'nothing'**, **of its 'inaction'**, **of the need for action**, **the time for action**, **the need for strategies**, **our inability to act as well as our desire to become 'active' again**. **We seem to deem ourselves in a kind of action vacuum which**, **like the cosmic black hole**, **tends to consume any renewed effort only to increase its size**. **Hence this is also an attempt to shift the focus again to the fact that we are continually acting and doing**, **and that there is n o such thing as not acting or doing nothing**.

F. Their conception of fiat is a fiction which misrepresents governmental decisionmaking – and are neither education nor predictable

Claude 1988

[Inis, Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia, States and the Global System, p18-20]

**This view of the state as an institutional monolith** is fostered by the notion of sovereignty, which calls up the image of the monarch, presiding over his kingdom. Sovereignty emphasizes the singularity of the state, its monopoly of authority, its unity of command and its capacity to speak with one voice. Thus, France wills, Iran demands, China intends, New Zealand promises and the Soviet Union insists. One all too easily conjures up the picture of a single-minded and purposeful state that decides exactly what it wants to achieve, adopts coherent policies intelligently adapted to its objectives, knows what it is doing, does what it intends and always has its act together. This view of the state is reinforced by political scientists’ emphasis upon the concept of policy and upon the thesis that governments derive policy from calculations of national interest. We thus take it for granted that states act internationally in accordance with rationally conceived and consciously constructed schemes of action, and we implicitly refuse to consider the possibility that alternatives to policy-directed behaviour may have importance–alternatives such as random, reactive, instinctual, habitual and conformist behaviour. Our rationalistic assumption that states do what they have planned to do tends to inhibit the discovery that states sometimes do what they feel compelled to do, or what they have the opportunity to do, or what they have usually done, or what other states are doing, or whatever the line of least resistance would seem to suggest. Academic preoccupation with the making of policy is accompanied by academic neglect of the execution of policy. We seem to assume that once the state has calculated its interest and contrived a policy to further that interest, the carrying out of policy is the virtually automatic result of the routine functioning of the bureaucratic mechanism of the state. I am inclined to call this the Genesis theory of public administration, taking as my text the passage: ‘And God said, Let there be light: and there was light’. I suspect that, in the realm of government, policy execution rarely follows so promptly and inexorably from policy statement. Alternatively, one may dub it the Pooh-Bah/Ko-Ko theory, honouring those denizens of William S. Gilbert’s Japan who took the position that when the Mikado ordered that something e done it was as good as done and might as well be declared to have been done. In the real world, that which a state decides to do is not as good as done; it may, in fact, never be done. And what states do, they may never have decided to do. Governments are not automatic machines, grinding out decisions and converting decisions into actions. They are agglomerations of human beings, like the rest of us inclined to be fallible, lazy, forgetful, indecisive, resistant to discipline and authority, and likely to fail to get the word or to heed it. As in other large organizations, left and right governmental hands are frequently ignorant of each other’s activities, official spokesmen contradict each other, ministries work at cross purposes, and the creaking machinery of government often gives the impression that no one is really in charge. I hope that no one will attribute my jaundiced view of government merely to the fact that I am an American–one, that is, whose personal experience is limited to a governmental system that is notoriously complex, disjointed, erratic, cumbersome and unpredictable. The United States does not, I suspect, have the least effective government or the most bumbling and incompetent bureaucracy in all the world. Here and there, now and then, governments do, of course perform prodigious feats of organization and administration: an extraordinary war effort, a flight to the moon, a successful hostage-rescue operation. More often, states have to make do with governments that are not notably clear about their purposes or coordinated and disciplined in their operations. This means that, in international relations, states are sometimes less dangerous, and sometimes less reliable, than one might think. Neither their threats nor their promises are to be taken with absolute seriousness. Above all, it means that we students of international politics must be cautious in attributing purposefulness and responsibility to governments. To say the that the United States was informed about an event is not to establish that the president acted in the light of that knowledge; he may never have heard about it. To say that a Soviet pilot shot down an airliner is not to prove that the Kremlin has adopted the policy of destroying all intruders into Soviet airspace; one wants to know how and by whom the decision to fire was made. To observe that the representative of Zimbabwe voted in favour of a particular resolution in the United Nations General Assembly is not necessarily to discover the nature of Zimbabwe’s policy on the affected matter; Zimbabwe may have no policy on that matter, and it may be that no one in the national capital has ever heard of the issue. We can hardly dispense with the convenient notion that Pakistan claims, Cuba promises, and Italy insists, and we cannot well abandon the formal position that governments speak for and act on behalf of their states, but it is essential that we bear constantly in mind the reality that governments are never fully in charge and never achieve the unity, purposefulness and discipline that theory attributes to them–and that they sometimes claim.

## 2ac a2: disads [1:50]

1. No Link: the 1ac is not a defense of a particular policy but, instead, a qualitative shift in the framework which limits increases in energy production to neoliberal market mechanisms

2. Post-Politics: the apocalyptic imagery of the disad is used to maintain a post-political structure which refuses to engage alternative paradigms for policy-making – this makes antagonism within democratic institutions impossible and allows rampant environmental destruction – that’s Swyngedouw

3. Evaluate discourse first: this debate is not about the consequences of a particular action but about the scholarship we engage and the advocacy each team provides – you should vote for the most ethical form of scholarship, not the most politically expedient one

4. The closed narrative of the disad risks subjecting decision-making processes to epistemic confusion which is at the heart of violent encounters with otherness

Kelley in 8

Patrick A; Major, U.S. Army, Director of National Intelligence, and National Defense Intelligence College Research Fellow; *Imperial Secrets. Remapping the Mind of Empire*; National Defense Intelligence College, Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, Washington, DC; p. 162-163

Tufte’s paean to the visual provides additional clues to the appeal of ekphrasis. **While appearing to offer the clarity and comprehensiveness of vision, the text contains both more and less than the image. The primary “value-added” content of a textual manifestation of spatial phenomena is in the format of text itself. Text provides narrative, direction and structure**—it harnesses and guides the “diversity of individual viewer styles.” In doing so, **it introduces into the ungoverned space of the image tools for ordering and classification,** for expressing the overarching obsession of antique rhetoric.385 **Less is provided insofar as narrative text**—a string of unbroken words, phrases and sentences—**viscerally offers no gaps; the paragraph conceals the empty spaces that are incorporated into an image or map. Negative information**, but information all the same, **is lost in the unity and completeness of text**. Similar to the conflation of understandings between fact and fiction noted earlier, **this theme raises another enduring problem of imperial intelligence for distinguishing (or not) between “showing” and “telling.”** While my modern references are always in danger of being outpaced by events, in a brief moment of pessimism I feel confident that the modern manifestation of this phenomenon will be relevant long after my writing—i.e. PowerPoint, or variants thereof. **Anyone familiar with decision-making processes in a large, modern organization, and especially the U.S. military and civilian government, will be familiar with the issue**. Far beyond the pedestrian dangers of “death-by-PowerPoint,” **this mode of information transmission risks serious epistemological confusions** of the kind I am exploring through traces from two millennia ago. These slides, or computer screens, are practically the apotheosis of this conflating technique. They look and feel like pictures, and are often liberally sprinkled with actual images of one kind or another—practically, they are “seen” before (if ever) they are “read.” Yet **in a performative sleight-of-hand, they are also texts of a particularly rigid, narrative and hierarchical type, reflecting the nature of the organizations opprobrium in which this technique is held**, however, **it remains, and will regretfully likely remain, ubiquitous and persistent because its very defects fulfill the dual functions of addition and deletion stemming from imperial information needs**. **Ekphrasis,** in my broader reading, **is then a way of transfiguring a vision of the world**—with all its apparent objectivity and openness to multiple readings— **into a structured discourse. Once so constituted, this discourse takes on a logocentric character, classifying the polyvalent possibilities of the image into a series of binary sets—same/different, domestic/foreign, interior/exterior, male/female—where one element is more or less self-contained, while the other is inferior, opposite or affected,**387 **forestalling the interpenetration of identity which genuinely characterizes the imperial encounter more accurately than the concepts of “conquest” or “colonization.”**388 **It** also thereby **conceals potentially fruitful sources of information, intelligence which cannot be assimilated because it simply doesn’t “fit.”** **If**, as Derrida would have it, **“there is no outside to the text,”**389 **the imperial information producer is straitjacketed from the outset.** Julia **Kristeva** would **multiply these constraints, noting that “every text is from the outset under the jurisdiction of other discourses which impose a universe on it**.”390 **These other discourses, and their intertextual relations**, however, **may offer escape routes from the normalizing rhetoric of narrative, providing alternative glimpses of the image beyond the ekphrasis**.

5. Security rhetoric frames debate to ignore value questions and political recognition of structural violence – this allows countless injustices committed to allay fear and anxiety

Bigo, 2k11

[Didier, Department of War Studies at the University of Manchester, “Northern Ireland as metaphor: Exception, suspicion and radicalization
in the ‘war on terror’,” “Security Dialogue, vol. 42 no. 6 483-498]

However, **the question is not to decipher what is the best between idealistic inaction and tough action, but** rather **to recognize that in any violent situation, a complex economy made of symbolic strategies is at stake**. **Such an economy reframes not only the reality of the threat but also the repertoire of actions undertaken in the name of the fight against the enemy.** Since the events of 11 September 2001 in the United States, **the threefold relationship and balance between freedom, security and danger has been modified**. The same holds true in the European Union (Brysk and Shafir, 2007; Bigo, 2002). As the threat is reappraised, **security now has an entirely positive connotation, while the negative overtones linked to its impact on freedom are swept aside. Rather than considering security as a process, one forgets its consequences and is led to think that ‘more security is a good thing’.** Security is then seen as a set of measures established for a delimited time that will disappear when the causes of the danger have been eliminated. However, Northern Ireland can provide useful insights on a segmented society that has been living in a culture of exceptionalism in which rights have been ‘temporarily’ suspended for 80 years. Northern Ireland illustrates the precariousness of political discourses on violence in the short and long terms. **Because what is really at stake in this debate is the technique of a certain kind of violence or a certain vision of the future made of and fed by fears and anxieties. Suspicion – reinforced by the feeling that an enemy is masked, hidden and probably already infiltrated among ‘us’ – can destroy the keystone principle of presumption of innocence and thus paradoxically help to complete the work that clandestine groups may have begun with bomb attacks**. Derogation from the rule of law, particularly when associated with discourses on the ‘foreigner’, can open a breach not only in the limitations defined by legal and institutional frameworks but also in the basic rights of the citizens seen as strangers, war prisoners or criminal suspects. **This breach**, once forced open, **twists the borders and creates spaces between the rules of national and international law, between the constitutional protection of citizens and the basic rights of a shared humanity.** It also violates the law by trying and playing with the borders between domestic and international law to justify in fine the most ordinary and least ethical practices. However, **are we facing a generalized state of exception,** as defined by Giorgio Agamben (1998, 2005), a situation that eventually leads to ‘bare life’? **Has a permanent and generalized state of exception risen from the 9/11 events, under the unilateral sovereignty of the United States**? While according to Agamben we are in a logic in which exception is proclaimed by a sole sovereign, we **find ourselves on the contrary in a diffracted process in which bureaucratic practices are daily routines and derogation is justified a posteriori as a necessity. We live in a non-imperial and non-Schmittian world in which unilateralism produces resistance, in which the definition of exception is always contested, even at a late stage, by judges or civil society** (Guild, 2003: 498; 2007), and **in which logics of resistance and reassessment prevent the authorities from concretizing their dreams and reducing individual lives to a mere system of biological survival, even when and where humans are detained and tortured** (Guittet, 2008b). Though the announcement by the British government that it will provide millions of pounds in compensation to former Guantánamo Bay prisoners has been the subject of controversy among ministers and officials, it tends to underline that we are still far from the position of Giorgio Agamben regarding what the exception means (Bigo, 2006). **We are indeed still in liberal regimes, dealing with, reproducing and hiding illiberal practices. And the originality of these liberal regimes – something that Agamben does not mention – lies in their capacity to recognize the other even when that other is using violence as a tool**.

6. Evaluate structural violence first

Žižek 2008

[Slavoj, senior researcher at the Institute of Sociology @ Univ. of Ljubljana, Violence, p. 1-2]

If there is a unifying thesis that runs through the bric-a-brac of reflections on violence that follow, it is that a similar paradox holds true for violence. At the forefront of our minds, the obvious signals of violence are acts of crime and terror, civil unrest, international conflict. But we should learn to step back, to disentangle ourselves from the fascinating lure of this directly visible "subjective" violence, violence performed by a clearly identifiable agent. We need to perceive the contours of the background which generates such outbursts. A step back enables us to identify a violence that sustains our very efforts to fight violence and to promote tolerance.This is the starting point, perhaps even the axiom, of the present book: subjective violence is just the most visible portion of a triumvirate that also includes two objective kinds of violence. First, there is a "symbolic" violence embodied in language and its forms, what Heidegger would call "our house of being." As we shall see later, this violence is not only at work in the obvious-and extensively studied-cases of incitement and of the relations of social domination reproduced in our habitual speech forms: there is a more fundamental form of violence still that pertains to language as such, to its imposition of a certain universe of meaning. Second, there is what I call "systemic" violence, or the often catastrophic consequences of the smooth functioning of our economic and political systems.The catch is that subjective and objective violence cannot be perceived from the same standpoint: subjective violence is experienced as such against the background of a non-violent zero level. It is seen as a perturbation of the "normal," peaceful state of things. However, objective violence is precisely the violence inherent to this "normal" state of things. Objective violence is invisible since it sustains the very zero-level standard against which we perceive something as subjectively violent. Systemic violence is thus something like the notorious "dark matter" of physics, the counterpart to an all-too visible subjective violence. It may be invisible, but it has to be taken into account if one is to make sense of what otherwise seem to be "irrational" explosions of subjective violence.

## 2ac a2: discourse links

This evidence is broadly theoretical and cites no examples

The discourse perspective is the most effective way to challenge the dominance of rational policy-making which sustains conventional energy systems

Scrase, 2k10

[Scrase, J. Ivan, and David G. Ockwell. "The role of discourse and linguistic framing effects in sustaining high carbon energy policy—An accessible introduction." Energy Policy 38.5 (2010): 2225-2233]

**There is a dominant conception of policy-making as an objective**, **linear process**. In essence the process is portrayed as **proceeding in a series of steps from facts to analysis**, **and then to solutions** (for a detailed critique of this linear view see Fischer, 2003). **In reality**, **policy-making is usually messy and political**, **rife with the exercise of interests and power**. **The veneer of objective**, **rational policy-making**, **that the dominant**, **linear model of policy-making supports is therefore cause for concern**. **It effectively sustains energy policy ‘business as usual’ and excludes many relevant voices that might be effective in opening up space to reframe energy policy problems and move towards more sustainable solutions** (see, for example, Ockwell, 2008). **This echoes concerns with what counts as knowledge and whose voices are heard in policy debates** that have characterised strands of several literatures in recent decades, including science and technology studies, sociology of scientific knowledge, and various strands of the political science and development literatures, **particularly in the context of** knowledge, **discourse and democracy**. **An alternative to the linear model is provided by a ‘discourse’ perspective**. This draws on political scientists’ observations of ways in which **politics and policy-making proceed through the use of language**, **and the expression of values and the assumptions therein**. **Discourse can be understood as**: ‘… **a shared way of apprehending the world**. **Embedded in language it enables subscribers to interpret bits of information and put them together into coherent stories or accounts**. **Each discourse rests on assumptions**, **judgements and contentions that provide the basic terms for analysis**, **debates**, **agreements and disagreements**…’ Dryzek (1997, p.8). **A discursive approach rejects the widely held assumption that policy language is a neutral medium through which ideas and an objective world are represented and discussed** (Darcy, 1999). **Discourse analysts examine and explain language use in a way that helps to reveal the underlying interests**, **value judgements and beliefs that are often disguised by policy actors’ factual claims and the arguments that these are used to support**. For example UK energy policy review documents issued in 2006–2007 are criticised below for presenting information in ways that subtly but consistently favoured new nuclear power while purporting to be undecided on the issue. **People** (including scientific and policy experts) **base their understanding of problems and solutions on their knowledge**, **experiences**, **interpretations and value judgements**. **These are** coloured and **shaped by social interactions**, for example by what is considered an ‘appropriate’ perspective in one's work life within certain institutions. **Policy actors therefore expend considerable effort on influencing the design and evolution of institutions in order to ensure problems and solutions are framed in ways they favour**. Thus **discourse is fundamental to the way that institutions are created**, **but in the short-term institutions also have a constraining or structuring effect**. At a more fundamental level there are even more rigid constraints, which can be identified as a set of core imperatives, such as sustained economic growth and national security, which states and their governments, with very few exceptions, must fulfil in order to ensure their survival (Dryzek et al., 2003—these are explored in detail further below).

Their links don’t assume the discourse perspective of the 1ac – we acknowledge the role of discourse without slipping into relativism

Scrase, 2k10

[Scrase, J. Ivan, and David G. Ockwell. "The role of discourse and linguistic framing effects in sustaining high carbon energy policy—An accessible introduction." Energy Policy 38.5 (2010): 2225-2233]

More **relativist perspectives** on discourse **see ‘reality’ as completely ‘constructed’ by people and societies** (Hay, 2002, p. 199). In this sense there is nothing outside of language or that cannot be brought back to the use of words. The assumption is that human reliance on language to understand the world is so complete but also so distorting that effectively there is no world outside our utterances. From this perspective, discourse is therefore solely responsible for determining political outcomes. **A more** (**critical**) **realist understanding is advanced here**. Three sets of limiting factors or constraints on the free play of discourse and its consequences are outlined below: institutional forms, outcomes or impacts, and state imperatives. **The fact that something is discursively constructed through social interaction does not make it any less real**. Law courts are very real institutions, for example, but they did not simply fall out of the sky. **Taking action on climate change in wealthy nations might involve passing a law forbidding expansion of airport capacity**. **This would first require a change in political values and beliefs that are currently reflected in the discourse that sees limitless flying as an individual right**. **Once such a new premise were established**, **negotiating the law and articulating the law itself and**, **to some extent**, **enforcing the law** (**within the context of court proceedings**) **would all be achieved through the use of language and the expression of values**, **interests and beliefs therein**. The environmental and social impacts of energy use can be very real, regardless of how partial or constructed people's understandings might be. Being able to heat homes and cook food adequately can be life-savers. Conversely the human cost and ecosystem impacts of a nuclear accident like Chernobyl cannot be wished away through a post-modern appeal to the way in which society constructs its experience of such impacts. Practices governed by energy policy have direct physical consequences for human beings, animals and nature which can result in their health suffering and, sometimes, their death. As well as these institutional and physical limitations on the role of discourse, there is a third, more enduring set of constraints. These consist of a number of imperatives, or functions that governments of most contemporary nation states must fulfil. These can be broken down into five categories (Dryzek et al., 2003, pp. 2 and 11). The first three involve maintaining domestic order, surviving internationally as an independent state and raising revenue. The remaining two have emerged with the rise of capitalist democracies: economic growth must be sustained and civil legitimacy maintained, so states are compelled to bear in mind the interests of investors and their citizens.

5. Floating PICs are bad:

A. Kills aff ground: allows the negative to garner the benefits of the 1ac without having to advocate solving for them

B. Doesn’t negate the resolution: Voting for the negative requires you to affirm the resolution

C. Education: they foreclose discussion of the topic – instead of debating the merits of removing a restrictive policy paradigm in energy production debate devolves into a race to the bottom where small distinctions and debates about competition rule the day

D. Reading the k without an alt solves their offense

E. Voter: for education and fairness

7. The 1ac was already a form of multi-level analysis – the permutation is just another articulation of this process

Lawhon and Murphy, 2k12

[Mary (University of Cap Town , South Africa); James (Clark University, USA), *Socio-Technical Regimes and Sustainability Transitions: Insights from Political Ecology*, Prog Hum Geogr, June 2012, vol. 36, no. 3, 354-378]

In this paper, we argue that one area of science and technology studies – **socio-technical transition theory** – **provides a particularly useful way** for geographers **to address these** concerns through its **multi-level conceptualization of how societies can transition toward more sustainable futures**. **It is especially relevant** for human geographers interested **in understanding how and why** certain **unsustainable development paths have evolved and what constrains a society**, **region**, **industry**, **or community from shifting toward more sustainable technical practices and social**, **economic**, **and political institutions**. **This framework can** be used to **shift the gaze** of human geographers **from particular artifacts or static socio-material patterns towards the co-evolution of technology and society**, **and the dynamic interactions between multiple social**, **political**, **and economic scales**. Further, it may enable human geographers to heuristically conceptualize the prospects for innovative sustainability initiatives, and inform policy accordingly. **The socio-technical transition framework’s potential**, **however**, **can only be realized if it is able to overcome** several key critiques and become less **elite and technologically focused**, more sensitive to the role of spatial and geographical **factors**, and better able to account for the role that power plays in guiding or preventing transitions toward more sustainable outcomes. We suggest that human geographers are well positioned to address these concerns **by building links between the burgeoning socio-technical transitions literature and political ecology**. Specifically, in this article we consider how **political-ecology approaches to questions of human-environmental change** – **namely the need to foreground social processes and power relations**, **critically examine the construction of knowledge**, **and engage with diverse subjects and contexts** – **can significantly improve socio-technical transition theory and practice**. Importantly, **we are** not **suggesting** a merging, or **that** all political ecology should focus on or be incorporated into socio-technical transitions theory, but for key **insights from political ecology** to **be incorporated into transition thinking**.1

7. We must have justifications and argumentation-without them, there is no mechanism for social change

Perloff in 2007

Richard, Communication Scholar, The Dynamics of Persasion

**Persuasion is so pervasive** that **we often don't ask the question: What sort of world would it be if there were no persuasive communications**? It would be a quieter world, that's for sure, one with less buzz, especially around dinnertime when telemarketers phone! But **without persuasion, people would have to resort to different ways to get their way. Many would resort to verbal abuse, threats, and coercion to accomplish** personal and **political goals**. **Argument would be devalued or nonexistent. Force**—either physical or psychological—**would carry the day**. **Persuasion**, by contrast, is a profoundly civilizing influence. It **says** that **disagreements between people can be resolved through logical arguments, emotional appeals**, **and faith** placed **in** the **speaker's credibility**. **Persuasion provides us with a constructive mechanism for advancing our claims and trying to change institutions**. **It offers a way for disgruntled and disenfranchised people to influence society. Persuasion provides a mechanism for everybody**—from kids trading Pokemon cards to Wall Street brokers selling stocks—**to advance in life** and achieve their goals. **Persuasion is not always pretty**. It can be mean, vociferous, and ugly, **Persuasion**, as Winston Churchill might say, **is the worst way to exert influence—except for all the others**. (Were there no persuasion, George W, Bush and Al Gore would not have settled their dispute about the 2000 election vote in the courtroom, but on the battlefield.) Perloff, Richard M. (2009-01-20). The Dynamics of Persuasion: Communication and Attitudes in the 21st Century, Second Edition (Lea's Communication) (Kindle Locations 918-922). LEA. Kindle Edition.

Alt fails – it produces a form of environmental pessimism that produces apathy

Sheppard, 2k4

[James, Ph.D. Binghamton, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Missouri-Kansas City, *Reducing Pessimism’s Sway in the Environmental Ethics Classroom*, Worldview: Environment Culture Religion, July 1, 2004]

**Given the breadth and depth of environmental challenges**, **it is tempting for students and teachers to adopt the view that small individual actions will be unlikely to impact on the overall situation in any significant manner**. Efforts to address environmental challenges individually seem to present us with a hopeless situation wherein little gets done and the systemic problems are left unaddressed. If anything that falls short of systemic change is likely to fail, what would seem to be needed would be some type of radical and revolutionary change in thinking and behavior. **Unfortunately**, **revolutionary change also is unlikely primarily because of the systemic nature of environmental challenges**. Put differently, it is unlikely that any silver bullet solution exists that would be able to permeate all parts of a system filled with so many problems on so many levels. **In the absence of a silver-bullet solution**, **addressing challenges once and for all visà- vis some radical systemic reorientation of thinking and practice is unlikely**. **If revolution is unlikely and if small individual actions are viewed as unviable options**, **it is to be expected that the pessimistic mood will find a place to take root**, **especially when it comes to how students view the possibility of change**. **Under the sway of the pessimistic mood**, **apathy and aloofness is apt to set in and the problems that exist today are likely to remain unaddressed**, **potentially becoming more serious and numerous**. As problems increase in severity and number, **it is entirely possible that the very hopelessness and inaction that contributed to the initial situation that produced hopelessness and inaction will also increase**—**a vicious downward spiral if there ever was one**. **Put simply**, **pessimism has a tendency to reinforce itself**. I have witnessed the reinforcing tendency of pessimism in especially vivid ways in the classroom. It is no secret that students play off the ideas, moods, and general dispositions of others in the college classroom. Questions asked, answers provided, body gestures offered, and the overall worldview expressed by certain students can take root in a classroom in various ways, including—but not limited to—what happens in class presentations, class discussions, group work, and informal discussions. Classroom dynamics often evolve and change rapidly over the course of a term; these changes are often spurred on by the introduction of certain issues.

The 1ac was already a form of multi-level analysis – the permutation is just another articulation of this process

Lawhon and Murphy, 2k12

[Mary (University of Cap Town , South Africa); James (Clark University, USA), *Socio-Technical Regimes and Sustainability Transitions: Insights from Political Ecology*, Prog Hum Geogr, June 2012, vol. 36, no. 3, 354-378]

In this paper, we argue that one area of science and technology studies – **socio-technical transition theory** – **provides a particularly useful way** for geographers **to address these** concerns through its **multi-level conceptualization of how societies can transition toward more sustainable futures**. **It is especially relevant** for human geographers interested **in understanding how and why** certain **unsustainable development paths have evolved and what constrains a society**, **region**, **industry**, **or community from shifting toward more sustainable technical practices and social**, **economic**, **and political institutions**. **This framework can** be used to **shift the gaze** of human geographers **from particular artifacts or static socio-material patterns towards the co-evolution of technology and society**, **and the dynamic interactions between multiple social**, **political**, **and economic scales**. Further, it may enable human geographers to heuristically conceptualize the prospects for innovative sustainability initiatives, and inform policy accordingly. **The socio-technical transition framework’s potential**, **however**, **can only be realized if it is able to overcome** several key critiques and become less **elite and technologically focused**, more sensitive to the role of spatial and geographical **factors**, and better able to account for the role that power plays in guiding or preventing transitions toward more sustainable outcomes. We suggest that human geographers are well positioned to address these concerns **by building links between the burgeoning socio-technical transitions literature and political ecology**. Specifically, in this article we consider how **political-ecology approaches to questions of human-environmental change** – **namely the need to foreground social processes and power relations**, **critically examine the construction of knowledge**, **and engage with diverse subjects and contexts** – **can significantly improve socio-technical transition theory and practice**. Importantly, **we are** not **suggesting** a merging, or **that** all political ecology should focus on or be incorporated into socio-technical transitions theory, but for key **insights from political ecology** to **be incorporated into transition thinking**.1

## 2ac module: (perm) reflexive governance

The permutation is a form of ‘reflexive governance’ which opens a space of contestation in the dialectic between governing structure and individual agency to

Grin et all, 2k9

[Voß, Jan-Peter, Adrian Smith, and John Grin. "Designing long-term policy: rethinking transition management." Policy Sciences 42.4 (2009): 275-302.]

Recent long-term policy concepts have been grouped under the label of **‘reflexive governance’**. In a reflexive perspective, governing **processes** as well as policy analysis **are** seen as shaping, **interlinked with and open to feedback from broader social**, **technological and ecological changes**, both in terms of innovative action and structural change (Grin 2006; Grin and van Staveren 2007; Voß and Kemp 2006; Smith and Stirling 2007). As such **governance is a** messy and **controversial process of multi-level institutional transformation**. **Each of the actors involved has only a limited view of the whole**—which may be incommensurable with constructions of others—**and restricted capacities to influence outcomes** (Smith and Stirling 2007). Discussion of the implications of such an orientation of reflexive governance is picked up in the literature on governance for sustainable development (Rip 2006; Voß et al. 2007; Hendriks and Grin2007; Meadowcroft 2007).9 **Reflexive governance strategies recognise the inherent ambivalence of policy goals**, **irreducible uncertainty about effects of alternative options**, **distributed agency and power shaping the process of implementation**, **a dialectic relation between policy design and societal context and the duality of structure and agency in processes of long-term change** (Voß and Kemp 2006; Meadowcroft 2009). All **reflexive planning approaches** unavoidably face a dilemma. On the one hand, the requirement is not to suppress diversity, but to **nurture bottom-up spontaneous developments that are open to ambivalence and contestation**, **and to retain adaptability towards the complex dynamics of change**. On the other hand, there remains a requirement to achieve coordination, to take a synoptic view on broader developments, to close down contingency, to fix long-term goals for orientation and mobilization.10 **In order to constructively deal with this dilemma of long-term guidance and short-term contextuality**, **most approaches to reflexive planning pragmatically combine top-down and bottom-up elements into more or less sophisticated procedural designs for social learning**. **The focus of policy is towards creating options and exploring paths of societal development**, **social innovation**, as it were, **rather than planning and then implementation**. At the same time it is acknowledged that there must be closing down around options, and commitments to long-lived (infra-) structures, that necessarily reduce flexibility owing to the path-dependencies they institute.

## 2ac module: (perm) post-politics

The post-political framework of status quo social, political, economic, and environmental discourse is what negates the radical antagonism of the 1ac and the alternative – only the perm solves

Doyle and Catney, 2k11

[Catney, Philip, and Timothy Doyle. "The welfare of now and the green (post) politics of the future." Critical Social Policy 31.2 (2011): 174-193.]

It is our claim in this paper that ‘sustainable development’ is part of a broader process of ‘post-politicalization’. **Whereas ‘the political’ opens up a realm where human societies can ‘seek answers to fundamental questions of politics** – who we are, what we should get, how we should live’ (Gamble, 2000: 1), **emphasizing the importance of the clash of alternative visions of future societal trajectories**, **post-political theorists3 argue that the space of the political is contracting in the face of the hegemonic grip that neo-liberal ideas have over public affairs**. **Post-political theorists claim that ‘consensus’ is promoted as a means of closing down debate about larger issues relating to political economy or existing global and societal power relations** (Paddison, 2009: 5). As Swyngedouw (2007: 24) observes, **post-politics is ‘about the administration of social or ecological matters**, **and they remain of course fully within the realm of the possible**, **of existing socioeconomic relations’**. Authors such as Zizek (1999), Ranciere (2007), Dikec (2007), Swyngedouw (2008) and others, argue that **a key factor behind the rise of a post-political order is the accelerated ‘policing’ of politics and policy processes by ‘bureaucrats’ and ‘experts’ who seek to naturalize particular governance arrangements and privilege certain ideas and interests**. **Governing becomes a matter of reducing disagreement and promoting consensus over the parameters of discussion so that politics becomes**, as Valentine (2005: 55) argues ‘a matter of maintaining a minimum level of cybernetic equilibrium within circumstances which it does not authorize and disagreement is reduced to the status of a practical problem in search of a solution’. **At the heart of post-political governance is the need to displace dissent and manufacture consent to prevent the politicization of policy** (Swyngedouw, 2008: 10). **It is argued that such an approach promotes ‘good governance’** – a term readily recognizable in the discourse of institutions such as the World Bank (Harrison, 2004) – **because important issues are not drawn into political disputes that reduce the scope for reasoned reflection on the optimal policy solution**. For critics of post-politics, participatory mechanisms are not a supplement to democracy, enhancing the opportunities for outside voices to be heard in the policy process, or a way of improving the rationality of policy processes, but are merely a way of manufacturing consensus and thereby limiting dissent.4 As Rosanvallon (2008: 254) observes, in processes of depoliticization there is often greater involvement and participation of civil society in politics and policy than there was previously. The construction of participatory mechanisms, alongside discursive constructions of threats and commonality of purpose, are perceived by critics of ‘post-politics’ as manipulative terms, as a means of staving off issues that are beyond the acceptable terms of the consensus. As we shall show below, by examining concepts such as liberal cosmopolitanism (and sustainable development) through a post-political lens, we can observe how these ideas can be used to promote a sense of solidarity through the development of a ‘global we’ which is dominated by the rationalities, and serves the interests, of the minority global North. In short, participatory mechanisms are under development in the global South which act to manufacture this consent of the primary importance of the ‘citizen of the future’ over the welfare of current citizens in the global South. Swyngedouw (2007: 27) argues that **the discourse of sustainability seeks to evacuate the potential for radically alternative socio-economic and socio-environmental orders by placing limits on ‘the possible’**, **by marginalizing or seeking to silence radical antagonisms**. In short, Swyngedouw (2007: 27) views climate change as representing the negation of the political and the promotion of post-politics. For Swyngedouw (2007: 26–7) **the construction of post-political environmental consensuses**: **is one that is radically reactionary**, **one that forestalls the articulation of divergent**, **conflicting**, **and alternative trajectories of future socioenvironmental possibilities and of human-human and human-nature articulations and assemblages**. **It holds on to a harmonious view of nature that can be recaptured while reproducing if not solidifying a liberal capitalist order for which there seems to be no alternative**. In the final part of this paper we argue that a particular global North (post-materialist, intergenerational) conception of sustainability has come to dominate conceptions of welfare and even the governance of the state in the global South, marginalizing more immediate welfare concerns in these states. **The analytical value of the post-political thesis is in its sensitizing of the potentially exclusionary nature of contemporary environmental debates and governance processes, in particular in constructing particular** (depoliticized) **‘futures’ which act to exclude alternative perspectives**. **The post-political offers a useful heuristic for understanding how the discourse of sustainable development can come to dominate and silence alternative future societal trajectories**, **in particular marginalizing the urgent welfare needs of peoples in the global South**.

# 1AR

The neo-malthusian economic understanding of populations as something to be managed and controlled is a dangerous form of biopolitics that justifies mass violence

**Edkins in 2000**

[Jenny, professor and real smart lady, Whose Hunger?]

In terms of famine policy today, neo-Malthusian approaches mean concentrating on a number of specific areas. The general ethos is a focus on large-scale, countrywide, or global solutions. Popu­lation control is of course important, but so is the increase of food production by improving agricultural techniques and incentives. Food stocks are crucial, and there is concern for food security. Environ­mental problems must be tackled, too, as it is important to bring an increasing area of the earth’s surface into production and to increase the efficient and sustainable use of that already cultivated. Pesticide and fertilizer development and the breeding of new plant varieties is another area of work. In terms of the response to famines them­selves, there is a tendency to blame the victim—for breeding too fast or whatever—and relief is sometimes given reluctantly. Food for work programs are favored over free distribution since otherwise the so-called feckless poor will continue to be dependent and lazy. The morality of relief is questioned by writers such as Garrett Hardin,63 who contend that helping the improvident will only increase the chance of global disaster. Since the carrying capacity of the earth, like a lifeboat, is limited, those who try to clamber aboard to save themselves must be firmly repulsed in the interest of the survival of the whole. Central to Malthus’s approach is the notion of population and the image this produces of famines afflicting entire societies. Aid workers still express surprise that this image is not borne out in prac­tice: it is not whole populations that suffer starvation in famines.64 Malthus’s work produced “population” as an object of study and a corresponding scientific discipline: demography. Although the Mal­thusian stress on the problem of population growth in relation to famine is not unchallenged in contemporary theory, it nevertheless continues to structure much of the thinking on the problem. Particu­larly in scientific discourse, the debate is between Malthusian pes­simists, who think that a population explosion to levels beyond the earth’s carrying capacity is inevitable, and Malthusian optimists, who believe that technology can continue to expand food produc­tion to outstrip population needs.65 A newspaper report preceding the 1994 United Nations conference on population in Cairo appeared under the headline “Overcrowding Points to Global Famine.” There was the usual photograph of a third world crowd, despite the refer­ence in the text of the report to the disproportionate consumption of resources by rich countries. The article discusses a report of the Worldwatch Institute (W\X71) that argues that “food scarcity, not mili­tary aggression, is the principle threat to our future,” and concludes “the world’s food supplies can no longer keep up with its exploding population growth.”66 Similar headlines followed the publication of the 1996 WWI report.67 Clearly the “population delusion”68 is still very much with us. In the 1970s, after the famines in the Sahel and the oil price crisis, confidence in the possibility of growth and technology solving the problems of the developing world was shaken. The situation was perceived as a world food crisis. The solution was seen as “Ending World Hunger”: a global problem with global solutions. Work on the global food regime69 was undertaken in the context of Malthusian projections and the “limits to growth” discourse.7° A plethora of publications appeared calling for action to solve the problem or dis­ciissiiig “world h tiuger.” Malthusian ideas are framed by a specific view of nature. In this view, not only is nature separate from man, but nature is seen as the site of competition over scarce resources rather than as fruitful, plen­tiful, or cooperative.72 Such concepts of scarcity, competition, and limits underlie modern economic theory, too. The idea of a battle with a (separate) nature leads to the need to understand and thus control natural forces, which is a driving force behind the natural as well as the human sciences. Environmentalism can be seen as a reassertion of the same Malthusian ideas of limits.73 The contradiction between a fear of scarcity (the root of the limits to growth argument) and the need for scarcity (to drive economics and hence growth) is embodied in the expression “sustainable development” and its politically power­ful articulation or linking of these disparate positions. Famine dis­course is central to this whole discursive formation because it repre­sents the point at which ideas of scarcity/abundance, culture/nature, food/want, famine/plenty, and life/death converge. Starvation and its skeletal forms depict a living death—evocative perhaps of our image of the limits posed by life-giving nature. As Nicholas Xenos puts it, “televised aud printed images of poverty and famine are con­stant reminders of the precariousness of the human condition.”74 We see such images as confirmation of a general condition of scarcity, not historically specific circumstances.

MALTHUS DOESN’T ACCOUNT FOR TECHNOLOGY WHICH KEEPS FOOD PRODUCTION LEVEL WITH POPULATION.

TUNS, JULY 2008

Paul, Editor of the Interim, Why Concern With Overpopulation is Wrong, http://www.theinterim.com/2008/july/10overpopulation.html

**Malthus was wrong because he did not foresee how the technological improvements of the 19th century would revolutionize agriculture and allow ever-fewer farmers to feed an ever-growing population, nor the benefits of trade.** (Nor could he envision refrigerated cargo containers carrying food around the globe.) In Malthus’s time, roughly one in three people in the United Kingdom were working in the agricultural, fishing and forestry industries – most of them farmers. **Within a century, that number was halved and by 2003, just 1.2 per cent of Brits were working within those industries. This would have shocked Malthus; for him, agriculture was a labour-intensive enterprise with most people living a subsistence existence and rural farmers selling their surplus to the cities. No wonder he thought population was imperiled by limited resource growth**.

Must act now – renewables are inevitable but they must be oriented towards environmental justice

Outka, 2k12

[Outka, Uma. "Environmental Justice in the Renewable Energy Transition." Journal of Environmental and Sustainability Law (University of Missouri School of Law), Forthcoming (2012)]

**The basic compatibility between** a transition toward greater reliance on **renewable energy and environmental justice does not preclude conflicts** at the project level, **nor does it absolve policymakers of the need for sensitivity to the potential implications of policy design features** promoting renewable resources. **At expected rates of growth**, **however**, **there is still time to integrate environmental justice and renewable energy policy before most of this infrastructure is built**. Short of technological or political changes that alter the current trajectory, **projections show renewables increasing from the current 10 percent to 16 percent of electric power in the U.S. over the next 20 years**.37 This section addresses environmental justice in connection with three key aspects of the renewable energy transition in the U.S.: (1) locating renewable energy projects; (2) defining “renewable energy” in law; and (3) access and inclusion in green economy benefits.